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1    Introduction 
The levels of corruption in a given country is considered an important indicator of the quality 
of governance, as it undermines the basic principles of democracy. In corrupt political 
structures, politicians and state officials act out of personal interest rather than the public 
interest, lining their own pockets at the expense of society. In that light, Transparancy 
International (TI) publishes, usually in late November or early December, its annual rankings 
based on the perceived levels of corruption in a given country. They are surely not the only 
one, as multiple, both governmental and non-governmental organizations map out the levels 
of corruption throughout the world. Corruption and its consequences caused rivers of ink to 
flow within the fields of political science. The World Bank (WB) publishes data akin to TI, of 
similar mass appeal. Despite the mutual critique of scholars on each other’s conceptual 
approaches resulting in different methods, the outcome tends to show a similar picture. 
Generally the ‘Northern states’ (i.e. North-western Europe, the United States and Canada, and 
Australia) are likely to score highly, followed by the remaining parts of Europe, Brazil and a 
number of Middle Eastern states. Those states considered to be failed (e.g. Afghanistan, North 
Korea, Somalia) are found at the very bottom of the list and play puss in the corner 
(Transparancy International, 2012; World Bank, 2012). 
 In general terms data on patronage shows us a comparable image. Despite the 
theoretically and empirically different character of both concepts, corruption and patronage 
are considered to be related, to the same extent as corruption is accepted to be related to the 
quality of democratic governance (Kopecký & Mair: 2012: 8; WB: 2012). However, a closer 
look at the data of Kopecký et al. (2012) reveals some peculiarities. Among the states 
recording high levels of patronage, Germany (0.43 on a 0-1 scale, 1 representing the highest 
possible levels of patronage) and Austria (0.49) can be found among states such as Hungary 
(0.43), Italy (0.47), and Greece (0.62), while both perform rather well in the levels of 
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corruption (i.e. low levels of corruption). Eleventh ranked Germany is left well behind the top 
performers in the patronage scale (i.e. low levels of patronage), such as the United Kingdom 
(0.09), the Netherlands (0.11), and Denmark (0.16).  
 In contrast to the data on patronage, the data on corruption groups Germany among the 
top performers (79 on a 0-100 scale, 100 representing the lowest levels of corruption), leaving 
on their turn the United Kingdom (74, ranked 17
th
), Ireland (69, ranked 25
th
), Spain (65, 
ranked 30
th
), Portugal (63, ranked 33
rd
), the Czech Republic (49, ranked 54
th
), and Bulgaria 
(41, ranked 75
th
) behind (Kopecký et al. 2012: 367). 
The German abnormity is an interesting case in light of Kopecký and Mair’s claim, which 
functions as the starting point of this thesis:  
 “ [ … ] it is also clear that patronage and corruption may in practice closely 
follow one another, as for example when patronage appointments are mode for 
the purpose of providing private kickbacks or in return for bribes. In a similar 
vein, patronage is an important supporting condition for the survival of 
systemic corruption, in that it is through the appointment of bureaucrats and 
other state personnel loyal to party politicians that operations designed to place 
checks on the activities of politics are often effectively covered up” (2012: 9).  
This claim is basically two-folded. First, they stress the possible tendency of patronage 
towards corruptions. Acts of patronage are now characterized by their aspiration to 
increase their control of institutions and to reward party loyalty, but ‘private 
kickbacks’ or ‘bribes’ fulfill the financial goals of a party in a corrupt system. Second, 
the appointment of officials who are considered to be loyal to the party might pursue 
the party interest rather than the public interest, by sweeping party aberrations, either 
intentional or unintentional, straight under the carpet. Both acts violate the principles 
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of democracy and the state’s legitimacy. While certain levels of patronage do not 
necessarily need to be harmful to the state, corruption generally is. 
 In order to provide further information on the relation between party patronage 
and corruption, this thesis will look into the country-cases of Germany and Italy, and 
will examine a number of prerequisites and proximates in which corruption prospers. 
In what way do they differ, causing Italy to fall prey to corruption, while Germany has 
been capable of maintaining low levels of corruption, despite the display of similar 
levels of patronage? This thesis consists of three parts. First, this thesis will offer an 
outline of the academic literature on the concepts of both patronage and corruption. 
This first part will not only focus on the concept itself, but also on its prerequisites and 
proximates: Under which conditions does corruption flourish and what are its direct 
causes? Second, the dataset of Kopecký et al. (2012) on party patronage will be put 
through further statistical analysis, testing the relation with corruption. How and to 
what extent does patronage relate to corruption? Is there a relation between patronage 
and corruption, or is the Italian country-case just a matter of sheer coincidence? Third, 
with the knowledge of the first and second part in mind, Germany and Italy will be 
analyzed in order to provide us with an answer to the main question of this thesis. 
How can the gap between both European states be explained?  
 
2    Theoretical Framework 
As stated earlier, corruption has been an important topic within the field of 
comparative politics. Democratization theory, political institutionalism, and 
international political economy are all different fields of interest interested in the 
phenomenon of political corruption, each from their respective perspective. If one 
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would consider the effects of corruption on both the micro and macro level, this seems 
only natural. Democratization theorists argue that corruption impacts the quality of 
democracy and hurts its legitimacy, as illustrated by the third wave of democracy, 
starting in the mid-1970s (Diamond, 1999: 91-93); Political economists emphasize the 
impact of corruption on a state’s credit generating capacity, isolating them from the 
world market (Elwert, 1993: 18). Each from their own perspective, corruption has 
been an important theme.  
In order to achieve a better understanding it is of the essence to examine the 
concept of corruption. What does it encompass and how does it differ from patronage? 
Although both concepts are entwined to a certain extent, they are too often, 
erroneously, used interchangeably (Kopecký & Mair, 2012: 8). Especially in popular 
writing (but certainly not exclusively), corruption is often used as an umbrella term, 
overarching a number of acts academics rather conceptualize separately. Often 
patronage is considered to be one of these acts, but it also covers other concepts such 
as clientelism or nepotism. Despite the loose attitude on these concepts, a clear 
distinction is vital in order to achieve a better understanding of political particularism. 
The confusion is explicable, as some – certainly not all, or in Kopecký and Scherlis’ 
terms “probably not most” (2008: 357) – acts of patronage can be considered to be 
acts of corruption. Both concepts do share certain dimensions, such as the involvement 
of two actors and the transaction of a certain state resource. Naturally, the different 
nature of these dimensions causes the differentiation between corruption and 
patronage, which will be the focus of the imminent.  
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 Corruption Patronage Clientelism 
State Resource Public Decision Jobs in state institutions Material rewards, 
public sector jobs 
Party Goal Financial Resources Control of institutions; 
reward of 
(organizational) loyalty 
Electoral support 
Corruptor Companies, 
entrepreneurs 
Anybody Electorate 
Legal Status Illegal Legal or illegal Legal or illegal 
Crucial Question Will you give me a 
bribe?  
Will you work for me?  Will you vote for 
me? 
Table 2.1 | Overview of the relation between corruption, patronage, and clientelism according to Kopecký and Mair (2012: 8) 
 
2.1    Conceptualizing Patronage 
The changing character of patronage through time further contributes to this muddle of 
concepts. Kopecký and Mair (2012) distinguish patronage as an electoral resource 
from patronage as an organizational resource. The former lost some of its relevance as 
it seems to be in decline, especially in contemporary Europe (Kopecký & Scherlis, 
2008: 359; Kopecký & Mair, 2012: 4). Patronage as an electoral resource is 
understood as the exchange of (public) goods in return for electoral support. The 
people’s vote is up for grabs and simply available to the highest bidder, as the 1960s 
Italian country-case taught us. The Monarchist party lost voters to the Socialist party, 
as their shoes and packets of pasta were no match for the Socialists’ ‘bigger packets’, 
containing not only pasta, but also money and letters of recommendation (Warner, 
1997: 538). Patronage as an electoral resource is characterized by the asymmetrical 
relationship, with a political party of a politician on one hand, and a potential voter on 
6 
 
the other. As the massive voter defection in the Italian case showed us, voters can get 
extremely opportunistic, caring less about ideology or political performance. In 
contemporary political science, this exchange most resembles the concept of 
clientelism. Clientelism is characterized by the vertical connection between a party (or 
politician) and a voter, in which the latter’s electoral support is exchanged for material 
rewards. However, the key difference between patronage as an electoral resource and 
clientelism is the lack of a personal, face-to-face patron-client relationship. The 
personal character of this exchange has eroded with the rise of mass parties and the 
increasing gap between the electorate and politicians. Additionally, clientelism is 
considered to be far more penetrating, as its reach is far greater, covering a wider 
range of exchanges, involving a greater number of state resources (Kopecký & Mair, 
2012: 5-9).  
 The changing nature of patronage can be explained through a number of factors. The 
diminishing ties between political parties and society, due to secularization and 
individualization, have increased the reciprocal distance. Party identification has decreased 
over time, causing party membership to drop and the electorate’s preferences to remain 
volatile. While we have witnessed a European trend in the decline of party membership, 
Italian membership rates dropped to a third over a 40-year course (Hague & Harrop, 2007: 
238). The monetarily implications of decreased membership, forced political parties to turn to 
the state for financial support, further increasing this gap (Kopecký & Scherlis, 2008: 360). 
The decline in membership rates has also led to a shift in the profile of party recruits. As the 
political parties moved away from its mass based-character, parties became more professional 
entities. While in 1800s American streets would be filled with low-profiled job seekers, 
hoping to benefit from electoral victory, contemporary parties prefer professional recruits to 
run their organizations (Bearfield, 2009: 65). 
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Despite their changing nature, both interpretations of the concept do share certain 
values, which irrevocably connects them. Kaufman (1974) defines three different variables: 
(1) The relationship is characterized by the presence of two unequal actors in terms of 
power and access. 
(2) The relation is based on the notion of ‘reciprocity’. Kaufman defines this as an 
“self-regulating form of interpersonal exchange, the maintenance of which 
depends on the return that each actor expects to obtain by rendering goods and 
services to the other and which ceases once the expected rewards fail to 
materialize” (1974: 285). 
(3) The particularistic and private nature of the relationship. 
Central in Kaufman’s typology is the exchange between patron and client. The subject 
of exchange can be, in electoral terms, material rewards (e.g. packets of pasta) for votes, or in 
organizational terms, jobs in state institutions for control in these institutions or as a simple 
return for party loyalty.  
The political party started to lose its mass-based, society rooted character in the post-
World War II period and gave way to the contemporary new-cadre or professional-electoral 
party (Hague & Harrop, 2007: 233-234; Kopecký & Mair, 2012: 10-11). Patronage in this 
understanding, as an organizational resource, lost its clientelistic, materialistic elements, as 
the collection of votes through these means has become less viable. The opportunistic 
character of the electorate proven earlier, would simply put too much organizational and 
financial pressure on a party to pursue certain strategies. Basically, it has become a matter of 
“too few jobs and too many voters” (Bearfield, 2009: 65). Patronage as an electoral resource 
is characterized by the linkage between a political party and society, while the party is more 
focused on the state in patronage as an organizational resource. In this perspective, the party 
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attempts to increase its power base not through society by gathering support of the electorate, 
but through positioning itself within state institutions. A contemporary approach of the 
concept refers to the capacity of political parties to appoint its people to positions in both the 
public and semi-public sphere. These positions may include, for example, posts in the central 
administration, civil service, public sector, universities, advisory committees, quangos (quasi-
autonomous non-governmental organizations, or non-departmental public bodies), etc. 
(Kopecký & Mair, 2012: 8; Kopecký & Scherlis, 2008: 356-360). The appointment of people 
should not be seen through the lens of patronage as an electoral resource, as it encompasses 
more than the traditionally held assumptions. It was already made clear that the notion of 
jobs-for-votes has not been feasible in this day and age, due to changing nature of the 
organizational structure of political parties, but even a more contemporary view on patronage 
as an intra-party merit system seems partial (Bearfield, 2009: 64-65). The loss of the 
traditional linkages with society has forced the new-cadre party to permeate institutions, in 
order to secure their power base. In an attempt to stay significant in today’s volatile electoral 
arena, political parties try to increase their scope of influence by appointing its candidates to 
prominent positions within the public and semi-public sector. Rather than an (intra-party) 
incentive system, patronage as an organizational resource has become a “mode of governing” 
(Kopecký & Mair, 2012: 10-11). This shift does not imply that patronage is no longer a mean 
of rewarding party loyalty, but simply not to the extent as patronage as an electoral resource 
or the concept of clientelism. 
2.2    The Functions of Patronage 
In an effort to achieve a deeper and better understanding Bearfield (2009: 68-73) distinguishes 
four different functions of patronage: (1) organizational patronage; (2) tactical patronage; (3) 
democratic patronage; and (4) reform patronage. These functions do not necessarily explain 
the concept of patronage itself, but aim at explaining the incentives of those political actors 
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involved in the phenomenon. In order to get a better understanding of the relationship 
between patronage and corruption, it is valuable to have insight in the motivation of political 
actors to engage in political patronage.  
Bearfield’s first function is the notion of organizational patronage, which touches upon 
Kopecký et al.’s (2008; 2012) listed conceptualization of patronage as an organizational 
resource. The goal of the party is to build a network, increase its sphere of influence and 
create a party machine. The first accounts of organizational patronage can be traced back to 
the pre-universal suffrage-era during the 17- and 1800s, where political positions were limited 
to only a few prominent families. Politics in general was characterized by relatives succeeding 
one another, redistributing public jobs amongst each other. In New York politics, these 
coalitions of elite families slowly developed into the political parties, showing the first, small 
but similar characteristics to those of today. This development continued on the federal level 
as Thomas Jefferson appointed like-minded, contrary to his initial intention to create an 
administration reflecting the political diversity in the United States. Patronage was common 
practice in the US, as Andrew Jackson pursued similar strategies, even taking it one step 
further, by filling political vacancies with candidates who were willing to support his 1828 
presidential run. The notion of organizational patronage can best be defined as a mean to pave 
the way for parties in office, avoiding as much political resistance as possible by putting like-
minded in positions of power (Bearfield, 2009: 68). The core of organizational patronage 
remained the same, although it developed in tandem with the changing political sphere (e.g. 
universal suffrage, changing party organizations, etc.).  
Contrary to organizational patronage, tactical patronage is aimed at building bridges, 
rather than paving the way for an individual party in office. In an attempt to overcome 
cleavages, of for example geographic, economic, social, racial, ethnic, or political nature, 
political actors try to forge a coalition, relying on a wide support base. This style of patronage 
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has often functioned as (part of) a solution for divided communities, such as the 1860 United 
States during the Lincoln presidency, and more recently, the 1960 the Netherlands facing 
pillarization. Through cooperation and shared responsibility, political divisions can be bridged 
(2009: 70).  
Bearfield claims tactical patronage can also be used as a mean to advance certain 
policy agenda, by ‘infiltrating’ agencies, through the appointment of its clients. Rather than 
‘paving the way’ as in organizational patronage, the tactical variant is aimed at influencing 
public policy in accordance to the patron’s views. Bearfield finds empirical evidence for this 
tactic in the Reagan- and Clinton case, who both appointed like-minded to institutions as the 
Federal Trade Commission and the U.S. Forest Service. Appointees were specifically selected 
to “infuse” agency policies (2009: 70). 
A third possible function of patronage can be of a more democratic nature, 
characterized by the notions of affirmative action. These programs are designed to increase 
the sphere of influence of underrepresented groups. Democratic patronage differs from 
tactical patronage, as it is from a less symbolic nature, not necessarily trying to bridge 
political cleavages, but more an attempt to create an administration representative of society. 
South Africa is probably one of the most eminent country-cases in regard of affirmative 
action policies in the post-apartheid era. As of today, certain policies are often formalized 
through legislation, aiming at including minorities though diversity recruitment and diversity 
trainings programs. Another fitting concept would be the notion of “rotation in office”, 
usually occurring right after a post-election governmental swing. Bearfield refers to Andrew 
Jackson in his inaugural speech, where he claims that the need for democratic patronage (he 
does not use these actual words) is a necessity in order to revitalize the bureaucracy. The new 
elected president states that “more is lost by the continuance of men in office than is generally 
gained by their experience” (Jackson, 1829). More recently, rotation in office can be 
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witnessed in for example Western Europe, where new government coalitions prefer to bring 
their own personal advisors and experts. The key position of democratic patronage is to 
provide equal access and opportunity, rather than bridging certain divisions by symbolical 
politics. Although this function of patronage is arguably most justifiable, it is equally prone to 
abuse as one can imagine (Bearfield, 2009: 70-71). 
The fourth and final function of patronage Bearfield highlights is the intent to reform. 
The recent rise of populist parties in European politics increased the significance of this 
function, but this intent can also be adapted by the established political parties, cutting ties 
with its traditional, good old boys’ network. Again, this specific function can be tied to a 
certain extent to democratic patronage, or Jackson’s notion of “rotation of office”. However, 
in this context, the accent is specifically on cutting ties with the good old boys’ politics of 
cryonism, rather than improving access and opportunities in the distribution of government 
jobs. Additionally, political parties pursuing the reformist principles of patronage will face a 
dilemma once they are elected into office, as they will need to appoint new people to replace 
the old networks. They are forced to use similar mechanisms of patronage to recruit their 
successors. The intent of turning around these networks of patronage, irrevocably creates new 
networks of professionals with similar knowledge, but from a different fragment of society 
(Bearfield 2009: 72-73; Carpenter, 2011).  
With these four different functions of patronage outlined, it is important to emphasize 
that they are not mutually exclusive. Some functions show a certain amount of 
correspondence, such as tactical and demographic patronage. Although its respective intent 
can very well be different, this does not necessarily need to generate a different political 
facade. Patronage can also still function as a mechanism to reward loyalty of party members, 
but is still likely to serve the actor that engages in it via one of these functions.   
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Another important, yet wrong general assumption, especially in popular writing, is that 
patronage is considered as something that is per definition immoral, violating democratic 
principles. As its functions indicated, patronage does not necessarily come at the expense of 
democracy and can occur perfectly within the legal framework of the state, contrary to, for 
example, corruption or nepotism. Its negative connotation has caused awareness among 
political parties in regard to the pursuit of patronage mechanisms in the recruitment process 
(Kopecký & Scherlis, 2008: 361). The size of this thesis does not allow to go into detail into 
the concept of democracy, but one could argue it encompass more than just ‘the will of the 
people’, as, for example, ‘good governance’, which would become more difficult if political 
parties cannot rely on their networks for the recruitment of government jobs (Keohane et al., 
2009). Not only is the assumption of patronage as ‘evil’ wrong as it can serve the interest of 
democracy and good governance, it also imposes difficulties on achieving a better 
understanding of the concept and its impact on political behavior, as the negative connotation 
makes political parties and politicians reluctant to provide data on the phenomenon (Bearfield, 
2009: 67). 
2.3    Conceptualizing Corruption 
As stated earlier, corruption is probably one of the most employed concepts in politics and is 
often (erroneously) used as a generic label. Even in academic writing, the concept of 
corruption is often tremendously overstretched, as academics tend to label, just as in popular 
writing, acts of patronage, clientelism, and nepotism as component of the concept, rather than 
separate. Despite what both fields have us believe, corruption has a far more specific 
character. Similar to patronage, it includes a certain transaction between two political actors, 
in which one of them has access to state resources. However, rather than access to certain jobs 
in state institutions, corruption allows the corruptor to ‘buy’ influence in the decision making 
process, conflicting with the true foundation of democracy. It encompasses “behavior which 
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deviates from the normal duties of a public role because of private-regarding, pecuniary or 
status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding 
influence” (Nye 1967: 565-566). The involved actor abuses his power at the expense of the 
democratic principles, and rests his public decisions on other interests, rather than 
representing the electorate.    
Philp (2002: 42) further explores this definition by identifying five different key 
elements: (1) “A public official”; (2) “in violation of the trust placed by him by the public”; 
(3) “and in a manner which harms the public interest”; (4) “knowingly engages in conduct 
which exploits the office for clear personal and private gain in a way which runs contrary to 
the accepted rules and standards for the conduct of public office within political culture”; (5) 
so as to benefit a third party by providing [them] with access to a good or service [they] 
would not otherwise obtain”. Similar to Nye, Philp identifies abusive behavior, at the 
expensive of the public – which placed its trust in the hands of the political actor – in favor of 
itself and its associates. The official received his power through democratic delegation, which 
comes with certain expectations. This power is based on the authority inherent to his position 
as public official. Due to the external interests influencing the decision making process, the 
sky is not as blue as the official might claim it is, either through political spinning or by 
simply covering up his illegitimate acts. Finally, according to Philp, it involves a certain 
transaction, similar to patronage, involving a third actor. This (generally anonymous) actor is 
able to position itself in a way it would not have been otherwise (2002: 42-43). 
An essential element which is missing in the conceptualization of both Nye and Philp 
is Brasz’s fifth notion in his own conceptualization of corruption: secrecy. Corruption occurs 
under the presumption of legality, as it is intentional (Brooks, 1910: 59). As the corrupted 
knows better, but rather prefers to pursue his own interests, the inefficient official simply does 
not. This notion, which is inherent to corruption, shows us the reason why improving our 
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understanding on this matter through research poses such problems, as the interests of 
political scientists conflict with those of corrupted political parties and politicians.  
The reticence among political parties and politicians in regard to providing political 
scientists with data seems only natural, as corruption is restricted through law and regulations. 
However, this regulation of corruption poses a problem for comparative analysis, due to the 
cross country differences on its conventional definition (Ragow & Laswell, 1963: 54-55). In 
other words, different countries have different values on corruption, resulting in different 
legal definitions. The legal approach on an act that would be considered corrupt in a socialist 
state, could very well be different in a capitalist state system, as both states apply different 
standards (Gardiner, 1993: 36). 
Despite varying norms and values, and legal definitions, corruption does pose a 
significant threat to different elements of society. The effects are clearly visible in developing 
states, which are generally hit hard by corruption. The effects of these threats hit different 
areas, varying from poverty and inequality to the environment. For example, corruption 
causes the prices for public services to rise, while its quality generally tends to drop, 
restricting access to water, education, health care, etc. As corruption generally tends to favor 
the rich, it reduces government revenue, as the wealthy are able to dodge taxes. Public and 
private investment usually remains low. Construction companies deliver poor constructions, 
as they use material of pitiable quality to reduce their costs. Both foreign and domestic direct 
investors are often deterred, due to the sphere of instability and uncertainty, pushing these 
states deeper into trouble (World Bank, 2004). The list of the costs and consequences seems 
almost endless, as this is only a fraction. Additionally, the empirical evidence on these matters 
overshadows the revisionist take on the potential benefits of corruption, such as elite 
integration and the integration of non-elites (Nye, 1967: 568-569). Data and reports published 
by the WB and TI show the harsh truth, as the most corrupt states (e.g. Somalia, North Korea, 
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Afghanistan) are notorious for their high levels of poverty and the violation of civil liberties 
and political rights (Freedom House, 2012).  
The previous conceptions are highly normative of nature and express a strong value 
judgment. Alternatively, a less normative argument on the concept of corruption can be made 
on John Locke’s interpretation of the social contract. According to the liberal principle of 
laissez-faire, which suggests limited, if not constricted state interference in the market, the 
laws of supply and demand prevails in an ideal and free market, pushing prices towards an 
equilibrium that will balance the demand against its supply (Balaam & Dillman, 2011: 28-29). 
However, the presence of the monopolistic condition on the supply side will distort this 
delicate balance between the demand of products and supply. Its function to protect the ideal 
and free market conflicts with the states’ position as participant, upsetting the free market 
mechanism. The corrupted state has become a stakeholder in a situation where it should 
arbitrate (Van Klaveren, 1957: 38-39).  
2.4    Prerequisites and Proximates of Corruption 
With the first part of the theoretical framework accounted for, we have entered the stage to 
look into the relation between patronage and corruption. Corruption on itself is a complicated 
phenomenon and countless academics already racked their brains on the concept. In order to 
get a better understanding of this relation, the following section will address both the 
prerequisites and proximates of corruption. Clearly, these causes show a certain level of 
interconnectedness (Perry, 1997: 70-71). This section will make the distinction between 
prerequisites and proximates. Prerequisites are conditions considered to be necessary, but in 
itself not sufficient to cause corruption. If these conditions are met for the worse, they have 
the aptitude to turn into a hotbed for corruption and can function as a catalyst. Second, there 
are the proximates of corruption, which are the instruments that cause the actual practices of 
corruption. The list of the proximates is long, if we look into the literature of corruption. 
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Braibanti (1962) alone provides twelve (partial) explanations for corruption (i.e. personal 
virtue; education; religion; colonialism; poverty; punitive codes; stage of development; 
environment; structure; transition; special training; and reflection of society). Other authors 
emphasize the importance of colonial factors, and the cultural causes and attitudes in the 
Soviet Union (Perry, 1997: 70-71). However, these seem less relevant for the cases subject to 
the comparative analysis of this thesis. Naturally, size limitations of this thesis does not allow 
going into detail of all variables. Doing so would come at the expense of its depth and quality. 
This thesis will derive its basis from Perry’s twofolded model (1997), distinguishing 
prerequisites to corruption from proximates. It will look into two variables of each feature: (1) 
bureaucracy and (2) morality as prerequisites, and (a) poverty and inequality, and (b) 
organized crime. Although the complexity of the concept makes it easy to criticize models, 
Perry’s account offers us a solid starting point. His conception contains certain elements that 
are more useful for the sake of this thesis than others, which explains the variation in amount 
of attention to the components. 
2.4.1    Prerequisites of Corruption 
As outlined in the previous section, prerequisites function as the necessary contexts in which 
corruption can thrive. These circumstances of a more general character than the proximates 
and are in itself not sufficient to prompt corruption. 
2.4.1.1    Bureaucracy 
Bureaucracy is the first prerequisite for corruption. Despite its similar conceptual nature to 
government, it should be emphasized that it is functionally different. Rather than creating 
legal frameworks, the bureaucracy is obliged to carry out these frameworks and can at most 
influence the political norms that are the foundation of the laws and regulation. Perry 
distinguishes three different features essential to character of bureaucracy as a potential 
breeding ground for corruption: (1) delay; (2) complexity; and (3) distance (1999: 77-78). The 
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first feature refers to ability of payments in order to speed up the bureaucratic process. These 
payments are in academic terms referred to as ‘speed money’. Perry illustrates this feature by 
highlighting De Soto’s experiment to start a business in Peru, which eventually took 289 days. 
The Peruvian bureaucracy required ten bribes, of which two were significant enough to block 
the process in its entirety (1997: 78). The second feature, complexity, is related to the former 
feature and refers to the amount of rules and regulations prescribed by the bureaucracy. 
Countless prescriptions works to the advantage of corruption, as bribes can potentially offer 
an easy way out. Although this feature might seemingly suggest a preference towards a 
simplification of the bureaucracy, this cannot always be achieved, as certain aspects of society 
require complex rules, such as building and safety prescriptions (1997: 78). The third feature 
relates to distance between the bureaucracy and the citizen from a geographical perspective. 
The delegation of power, the root of evil according to the Nye and Philp’s take on corruption, 
was inevitable in old times, lacking the means to communicate quickly. The French 
decentralization played into the hands of corruption, allowing local government to pursue 
their own interests, at the expense of the empire’s interests, making corruption a more 
“complex and diffuse target”. Central authorities of the time faced difficulties combating the 
phenomenon (1997: 78-79). Arguments on both sides seem feasible. Centralists point out the 
advantages based on the notions of central consistency, economy and the enforceability of a 
central policy. Decentralists warn for the risks of inadequate information, cultural distance 
and the cumbersome procedures of central authorities, pointing out the advantages of local 
knowledge, local opinion, decisiveness and the benefits of face-to-face relations. 
Davidson (1992) adds another element to the bureaucracy, by outlining its level of 
professionalization. Bureaucracies recruiting civil servants on the basis of education and 
competence are less likely to turn corrupt. In return, these civil servants receive suitable wage 
rates and secondary benefits. In the third world and (former) communist states, the 
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bureaucracy recruits is servants generally through nepotistic mechanisms, characterized by 
affordability and ideology, rather than competence.  
2.4.1.2    Morality 
The second prerequisite Perry describes is the notion of morality. Clearly, small scale 
corruption starts from the ‘rotten apple’, the civil servant who prefers to pursue its personal 
interests, rather than the public interest that he represents. This pursuit of self-interest is 
generally tied to words as greed and self-indulgence (Perry, 1997: 73). Previously, Philp has 
identified this actor as the public official, holding office (2002: 42). However, morality is not 
a matter of the individual, but rather an aggregate. The individual acts within the boundaries 
of norms and values within society that makes up the morale: “the volume and scale of 
corruption in a country is mainly determined by its general tone or standards, and by the 
attitudes or values of its citizens” (Lethbridge, 1985: 214). The political attitude towards 
corruption on the macro-level basically enables or restricts the public official on the micro 
level. Naturally, this does not mean that corruption does not occur in societies which 
disapprove corruption, but it does make corrupt practice less likely. The argument of 
‘everybody does it’ is perhaps most characteristic for this notion. 
2.4.2    Proximates of Corruption 
With the prerequisites of corruption set out, the following section will look at specific 
variables that are likely to trigger corruption, rather than function as a context in where 
corruption can ‘flourish’.  
2.4.2.1    Poverty and Inequality 
Poverty is often considered as one of the most common factors in explaining corruption, 
especially in the third world. The concept encompass more than just an suitable income, as it 
also includes both the quantity and quality of public services, such as education, health, water 
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and sanitation (Perry, 1997: 83; Teggeman, 2007). Data on the relation of poverty to 
corruption tends to show a strong correlation, as rich countries tend to endure less corruption 
than poor countries. Corruption affects the levels of investment and growth, as it causes scares 
among foreign investors and encourages business to maneuver in the unofficial economy, 
dodging laws and taxes (Rose-Ackermann, 1999: 2-4). This notion is strengthened by the 
reciprocal relationship between both phenomena, as poverty not only causes corruption, but 
corruption in its turn also increases the levels of poverty in a given country, creating a 
downwards spiral (Treisman, 2000: 249). 
 Nevertheless, solid wage rates and secondary benefits distributed in professional 
bureaucracies are no guarantee to out root corruption. Although low wage rates in imperial 
China were the key its widespread corruption, low paid officials are not necessarily more 
likely to engage in practices of corruption than well paid officials, as the additional financial 
income through corruption is not inevitably a matter of necessity. The civil servant becomes 
in its turn a financial source (e.g. loans, school fees, medical expenses) to its personal 
network, for example due to the (cultural) tradition of generosity (Perry, 1997: 83-84). A 
better understanding can be achieved when poverty is defined in terms of inequality, as 
poverty is a wide-ranging concept. Alam (1997) defines ‘countervailing actions’ (or lack 
thereof) as an important factor of corruption, as an upturn in ability of the victims to act on 
corruption decreases the likeness of the phenomenon to occur. These abilities are dependent 
on the financial resources of the victims, as ‘countervailing actions’ (evasive, direct or illicit) 
require a certain level of income to finance them (e.g. taking corrupt officials to court, 
organization of strikes). Therefore, reverse logic implies that inequality limits victims in their 
resources, allowing corruption to prevail (Alam, 1997). Although Alam’s notion on 
countervailing actions seems reasonable, income inequality does not necessarily gives us any 
insight on the absolute income levels. The relativeness of income inequality makes it possible 
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that, despite high income inequality, the lowest levels might still have sufficient financial 
resources to finance countervailing actions.   
 Although Alam’s line of reasoning is frail, income inequality as a proximate of 
corruption should not be thrown overboard. Additionally to his plea, Dabla-Norris and Wade 
(2002) argue that income inequality can prompt corruption via the allocation of human capital 
(i.e. labor, talent) and financial capital. Those who control capital decide whether they 
allocate this into the official or the unofficial economy. In already volatile economic markets, 
the expected revenue in the unofficial economy is likely to be higher, as official business is 
more vulnerable to expropriation (e.g. features of bureaucracy: delay, complexity). Naturally, 
engaging in these corrupt activities has its price, since it generally requires the payment of a 
“lump sum cost” (2002: 441). Clearly, in terms of costs and resources, only the well-off are 
able to fork out these amounts of money. Throughout history, we have seen this repeatedly: 
civil servants in Mandarin China and medieval Europe (‘Baumol, 1990’ in Dable-Norris & 
Wade, 2002: 440); the bourgeoisie in seventeenth century France (‘Braudel, 1982’ in Dable-
Norris & Wade, 2002: 440); and wealthy citizens in the Roman republic (‘Levi, 1988’ in 
Dable-Norris & Wade, 2002: 440).   
2.4.2.2    Organized Crime 
The initial term coined by Perry, conspiracy, is rather poorly chosen, as it raises instant 
skepticism. The sense of paranoia and hysteria associated with it reminds of phenomena such 
as the Second Red Scare (U.S. Senator Joseph McCarthy’s hunt on communist infiltrators 
within the U.S. political institutions), the New World Order (secretive power elite aspiring 
authoritarian world domination), and the countless 9/11 conspiracy theories and limits an 
objective approach. Although fascinating, it has little to do with academic research. Organized 
crime as a proximate of corruption deserves more respect. 
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 Benson claims organized crime is the ‘largest single cause’ for corruption in the 
United States, but clearly this does not solely apply to the American system (‘1978’ in Perry, 
1997: 91). Australia, France and a number of African cases suffer from the same 
phenomenon. Rather than corruption on the individual level (the ‘bad apple’), a worst case 
scenario encompass entire agencies, directing groups, and political parties dominated by 
criminal networks, attempting to expand their sphere of influence. Generally, this type of 
corruption of starts with vice-activities (e.g. prostitution, drugs, illegal gambling) which often 
are (gray) areas of disagreement between government institutions and lawmakers on one side, 
and a substantial or influential part of popular opinion on the other. Additionally, the 
malicious character of the sector lowers the hurdles of corrupt activities along with the 
incorporation of a certain level of tolerance towards it, generating a risk of spillover to other 
public sectors. The Australian New South Wales Police Force has been one of the more 
publicized cases, where corruption got the better of a law enforcing institution, turning it into 
an extension of criminal activity. The 1995 Wood Royal Commission unfolded a series of 
systemic bribery, money laundering, drug trafficking, and the falsification of evidence by the 
police department (Police Integrity Commission: 1999). The motivations of these criminal 
networks are clear: securing the continuation of their illicit activities and consolidating their 
power base.  
Shelley (1995) takes it one step further, by arguing that some criminal networks are 
interested in active involvement in politics, as holding office allows them to influence the 
legal framework, in accordance with their own personal interests. Rather than building 
‘external relationships’ with ‘independent’ civil servants, criminal networks attempt to work 
their way into the institutions. Societies facing democratic transition are generally more 
vulnerable to the malicious intent of organized crime. Inherent to crime, criminal networks 
tend to undermine the current rule of law and democratic legitimacy. Once they have gained 
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office, their supposedly representative, democratic function gets thrown overboard and the 
public interest makes place for the interest of the criminal network.   
 The previous account is only a fraction of the academic literature on prerequisites and 
proximates of corruption, which shows the complexity of the phenomenon. Corruption 
requires more than an individual actor willing to engage in certain activities, as its explanatory 
power is rather limited (Perry, 1997: 93). The multi-causality and multi-connectedness of the 
variables surrounding corruption limits any reductionism, ruling out an ‘easy’ answer.  
 
3    Theory and Hypotheses 
The previous sections have shown patronage and corruption encompass more than what 
popular writing – and sometimes even academic writing – makes us believe. Clearly, the 
generic label is an oversimplification of reality, which hampers our understanding of this 
specific type of political behavior. Theory building and a proper (academic) understanding of 
behavior requires well-crafted concepts, as poorly crafted concepts can at best generate a 
great idea, poorly implemented (Gerring, 1999: 381). Generalizability of social theories on 
itself already causes difficulty but become even harder if the initial concepts are surrounded 
by confusion and inaccuracies.  
 In order to make any claims on the relation between patronage and corruption and 
increase our understanding of this type of behavior, it is of the essence to take the functions of 
patronage into account. Naturally, any differentiation in the motives of political behavior 
regarding patronage is likely to create a different output. Appointments through mechanisms 
of patronage driven by an organizational motive are likely to create a different outcome than 
appointments driven by democratic patronage (Bearfield, 2009: 68-69). A party looking at 
increasing their reach and expanding their sphere of influence will likely appoint a different 
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candidate to a job position than a party looking to bridge a certain social or ethnic cleavage 
within society. Bearing these varying motives in mind, it seems only natural that these 
motives also cause discrepancies in its relation to corruption. 
 With the theoretical framework on patronage and corruption lined out, this thesis is 
allowed to move back to its initial point of interest. In the light of the assumed relationship 
between patronage and corruption, and Kopecký and Scherlis’ claim of patronage as a 
necessary condition for corruption (2008: 357), how can the discrepancy in the levels of 
corruption in the German and Italian case be explained? What causes corruption to skyrocket 
in Italy, while it is kept to a reasonable, below average level in Germany, despite the similar 
levels of patronage? How can patronage in Germany and Italy be characterized in terms of the 
prerequisites (i.e. (1) morality and (2) bureaucracy) and proximates (i.e. (a) poverty and 
inequality and (b) organized crime) of corruption? 
 The first pieces of this puzzle are of a quantitative nature, as it will look into the 
statistical relation between patronage and corruption. This far, the general assumption is that 
there is a relationship based on the levels of conceptual and empirical resemblances. Kopecký 
and Scherlis (2008) take it up a notch by labeling patronage is a prerequisite of corruption, 
which implies a certain sense of causality. What can be inferred from the available 
quantitative data sources? Does the data reflect Kopecký and Scherlis’ claim and offer 
empirical evidence for their assumption? Statistical data on corruption is plentiful, as it is a 
central topic in different fields of political science. This abundance of statistical data should 
be used in this puzzle.  
 
4    Research Methods, Data, and Relevance 
The previous section offered a little insight on the structure of this thesis. The evaluation of 
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the quantitative data on the relation of patronage to corruption is of a more deductive nature, 
as the assumed relationship and Kopecký and Scherlis’ hypothesis will function as the starting 
point. Along the road, this thesis will combine deductive and inductive elements in resolving 
this puzzle. 
4.1    Nested Analysis 
In order to increase the understanding on this matter this thesis calls for the use of nested 
analysis, combining large-N analysis (LNA) with small-N analysis (SNA), merging the best 
of both worlds: The benefits of large-N statistical analysis on one hand, and the in-depth 
investigation of limited-N research. By integrating qualitative and quantitative methods, this 
method is able to overcome some of the (reciprocal) critiques on both methods. Nested 
analysis allows us to explore the general relationship and the specific explanation of 
individual cases (i.e. Germany and Italy) (Lieberman, 2005: 435-436).  
 Nested Analysis initially starts with an LNA of the systemic level, accounting for 
fifteen cases (i.e. Austria, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Hungary, 
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Greece, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, and the United 
Kingdom), derived from Kopecký et al.’s research on patronage in contemporary Europe 
(2012). Although LNA is often criticized for its ‘thin’ (i.e. reductionist, simplistic) concepts 
and theories, it provides research with a reliable method to test generalizations about complex 
causal relationships (Coppedge, 1999: 465). Furthermore, LNA offers a mechanism to test the 
strength of specific explanations, as it transcends cross-country variance, clouding country-
level outcomes (Lieberman, 2005: 439). 
 The second step in nested analysis involves a shift in the level of analysis towards the 
domestic level. Naturally, the results of the LNA determine the following step. Robust 
outcomes of the LNA allow testing the model. If the results do not sufficiently address 
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preliminary assumptions, the SNA will focus on model building (Mb-SNA), rather than model 
testing (Mt-SNA). This variation, dependent on the results of the LNA, sets its limits on the 
character of this thesis, as it does not allow a clear deductive or inductive approach initially 
(Lieberman, 2005: 441-443). Additionally, social science, unlike e.g. medical research, is not 
merely interested in causality, but also in the explanation of a certain causal relationship. SNA 
allows us to make inferences about simple causation and craft ‘thick’ (i.e. complex, 
multidimensional) concepts and theory, but comes at the expense of generalization. 
(Coppedge, 1999: 435).  
 The selection of Germany and Italy as the central country-cases in this study is based 
on their similar levels of patronage. Since patronage is treated as the independent variable in 
Kopecký and Scherlis’ (2008) assumption and in this thesis, it naturally required two cases 
with similar levels, disqualifying a number of cases (i.e. United Kingdom, Netherlands, 
Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Portugal, Ireland, Czech Republic, and Greece). Additionally, 
country-cases with similar levels of corruption (i.e. Spain, and Austria) are neither helpful as 
they do not offer any insight in the relation between both concepts due to their similarity. 
Since this thesis is interested in the differentiation of the dependent variable (i.e. corruption), 
it will apply the logic of Mill’s Method of Difference, or a Most Similar Systems Design 
(MSSD), rather than Mill’s Method of Difference or a Most Different Systems Design 
(MDSD). Among Bulgaria and Hungary, Italy displays most similarities to the German case, 
from a cultural, political and socio economic perspective. Additionally, due to Bulgaria and 
Hungary’s communist past, Italy is able to provide the richest set of data on both patronage 
and corruption, which offers a solid foundation to this thesis to build its conclusions on. 
4.2    Data 
The illicit nature of corruption limits academic research, as the involved actors are naturally 
not keen on lifting the blanket in regard to these practices. The reluctance of the corruptor and 
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the corrupted seems only natural, as their personal interests are diametrically opposed to both 
academic and public interest. Additionally, the analysis of monetary flows to measure the 
phenomenon would disregard its social costs. Quantifying the costs of social malaise, 
illiteracy, and poor levels of public services would be a difficult, if not impossible task (TI, 
2000). Clearly these limitations restrict academics to collect reliable data on the phenomenon. 
To overcome these difficulties, institutions as, inter alios, TI and the WB tend to measure the 
perceptions of corruption rather than the actual level. Therefore, whenever this thesis refers to 
the ‘levels of corruption’, this should be understood as the ‘perceived levels of corruption’.   
Although patronage is not per definition illegal, its negative connotation causes 
limitations of similar nature. Political actors are equally reluctant, as both concepts are often 
used interchangeably.  
Nevertheless, this thesis has derived its data solely from second-hand sources, as the 
data is collected externally. The analysis was based on triangulation of the available data and 
combined quantitative and qualitative research. The analysis of this thesis relies on the review 
of secondary literature, statistical analysis, and qualitative analysis. The quantitative data is 
collected from a number of sources such as, inter alios, TI, the WB, and Kopecký et al. The 
qualitative data consists of academic literature and country studies.  
4.3    Social and Scientific Relevance 
A quick look at the Corruption Perceptions Index-rankings (CPI) of TI immediately shows 
the vast consequences of corruption on the life of millions worldwide. Its importance is 
further emphasized by the amount of attention it receives from national and international 
organizations (both governmental and non-governmental), such as the European Union and 
the United Nations. Its effect on various aspects of society has widely been demonstrated in 
academic research. Clearly, the hope among policymakers worldwide is that an understanding 
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of the phenomena eventually will cause its extinction, or at least a decline, improving the life 
of societies worldwide. 
 Although that goal is noble and the social consequences of corruption are vast, the 
social relevance is not the crux of the matter for this thesis. As political science is the study of 
political behavior, it is interested in the underlying relation of phenomena at the individual, 
domestic or systemic level. As explained earlier, in order to improve the scientific 
understanding of a concept it is crucial to understand related, causal concepts. Therefore, in 
the case of patronage and corruption it is important to understand the concept patronage 
before we can make any inferences on the relation between both concepts.      
 
5    Preliminary Empirical Testing of Patronage and Corruption 
The first step in improving the understanding of the relationship of patronage to corruption is 
mapping out its statistical affiliation. To what extent is Kopecký and Scherlis’ assumption of 
causality of patronage to corruption supported by empirical evidence? What insights can be 
gained from data on patronage and corruption?  
The following LNA includes fifteen European country-cases. As stated before and is 
generally assumed, Germany scores relatively well in terms of (the combat of) corruption 
(figure 5.1 and 5.2). Both TI and the WB rank Germany in the uppers echelons regarding the 
levels of corruption, recording low levels of the phenomenon. According to their data 
Germany is ranked fifth in a list totaling fifteen country-cases, based on Kopecký et al.’s 
initial case selection (2012). In both datasets Germany is in pursuit of respectively Denmark, 
Norway, the Netherlands, and Iceland while they leave the United Kingdom, Ireland, Austria, 
Spain, Portugal, Hungary, Czech Republic, Italy, Bulgaria, and Greece behind. Germany 
scores well below the average of both TI’s CPI (scoring 79, exceeding a mean of 65.5) (figure 
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5.1) and the WB’s Control of Corruption (CC) (scoring 92.9, exceeding a mean of 81.4) 
(figure 5.2). The CC is a sub-indicator of the World Governance Indicator (WGI), a tool to 
measure the quality of governance by the WB. In both rankings scores are ascending, in 
which a score of 0 reflects the lowest possible score (records of the highest levels of 
corruption) and 100 reflects the highest possible score (records of the lowest levels of 
corruption). These scores are aggregates of views and experiences of survey respondents and 
experts in the public and private sector, as well as NGO’s.  
 
 
Figure 5.1 | The CPI scores (perceived levels of corruption) according to Transparency International (2012)  
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Figure 5.2 | The CC scores (perceived levels of corruption) according to the WB (2012) 
 
At first sight, we see a similar development in the data regarding the levels of 
patronage (figure 5.3). Beforehand, it should be noted that, contrary to TI and the WB, the 
patronage index is descending, as  a score of ‘0’ represent the lowest levels of patronage while 
‘1’ represent the highest levels of patronage. The Northern European country-cases tend to 
score rather well, while we see a general tendency of Southern and Eastern European country-
cases to perform rather poor. However, Germany (0.43) and Austria (0.49) are seemingly the 
odd man out, as they are considered top performers in the corruptions rankings of TI and the 
WB. Both country-cases score well below the mean of 0.34. While Germany initially left 
behind a number of country-cases, in the patronage rankings it only leaves behind Italy (0.47), 
Austria (0.49), and Greece (0.62). Germany makes the biggest downfall, dropping seven spots 
in the rankings when we compare the data.  
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Figure 5.3 | Party patronage-index scores according to Kopecký et al. (2012)  
 
Despite the discrepancy between Germany’s numbers on corruption and patronage 
there is a moderate, but nevertheless significant correlation between the levels of corruption 
and patronage, as shown by the calculations below (table 5.1). The correlation coefficient 
with the CPI is -.719, while the correlation coefficient with the CC is calculated at -.695. The 
negative correlation is caused by the different (ascending vs. descending) directions of both 
indexes, but is no influence on the conclusion we can draw: Despite the unique position of the 
German country-case, the higher the level of patronage, the more likely it is we see an 
increase in the levels of corruption. Or in terms of the indexes: a low value in patronage is 
likely to be accompanied by a high value in corruption. Italy’s high levels of patronage and 
high levels of corruption are not just a matter of mere coincidence. 
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  Patronage CPI CC 
Patronage 
Pearson Correlation 1 -.719 -.695 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .003 .004 
N 15 15 15 
CPI 
Pearson Correlation -.719 1 .981 
Sig. (2-tailed) .003  .000 
N 15 15 15 
CC 
Pearson Correlation -.695 .981 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .004 .000  
N 15 15 15 
Table 5.1 | Correlation between the CPI, CC, and patronage 
 
The scatterplot (figure 5.4) gives a visual reflection of the data, plotting the country-
cases around the line of best fit. Country-cases as the Netherlands, Ireland, and Hungary are 
positioned near the linear, while Germany is removed the furthest, representing the ‘worst fit’ 
in the model. According to the model, the R
2
 is calculated at 0.517, which implies that 
patronage explains 51.7% of corruption (corruption according to the methodology of TI). 
Removal of the German country-case would increase the explained variance of the model by 
0.098, to 0.615, further emphasizing its position as outlier.      
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Figure 5.4 | Scatterplot positioning all country-cases  
 
Additionally, the scatterplot also allows insight in the justification of Italy as 
Germany’s counter-case in this thesis. Ideally, the second case accounts for levels of 
patronage below this line (Lieberman, 2005: 444). Italy is well below the line of best fit, 
allowing Off-the-Line comparative study.  
 
6    Empirical Analysis 
Italy’s high levels of both patronage and corruption is not just a matter of mere coincidence, 
as statistical analysis pointed out that both phenomena generally go hand in hand. Now that a 
rather anecdotal claim is supported by empirical evidence, it is time to look into the 
prerequisites and proximates of corruption in relation to patronage. Which variables are 
present in Italy, causing corruption to skyrocket compared to the German country case? 
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6.1    Patronage and Bureaucracy 
The first prerequisite that will be taken under review is the bureaucracy, as it is a common 
destination for recruits appointed by political parties. Its character is important as it the 
foundation for other potential variables contributing to the triangular relation of patronage and 
corruption.    
6.1.1    The German Bureaucracy 
Typical for the Western European political systems in general, political parties function as the 
central actors within Germany, as they are the center of the electoral process and the expresser 
of (sub-) national interests. However, its catastrophic history of totalitarian, far right politics 
deeply impacted contemporary German politics, as it attempts to eliminate any radical 
elements from the political system. Its Grundgesetz (Basic Law) is extra concerned with the 
prevention of the emergence of anti-system parties from both the left and right side of the 
political spectrum  (O’Neil et al., 2010: 184), and a 1970s purge of the bureaucracy to sideline 
radicals resulted in the introduction of loyalty oaths (Kesselman & Krieger, 2009: 216). 
Despite these measures, political parties remain the central actors in the recruitment process in 
the public and semi-public sphere and this interconnectedness is reflected by the significant 
amount of civil servants among party members, which makes up 28 to 42 percent of total 
party membership. Joining a political party is seen as a wise step for ambitious public 
servants, as this improves their career prospects (‘Biehl, 2006’ in John & Poguntke, 2012: 
122).  
 Before the German bureaucracy is assessed, it should be noted that it consists of three 
different political levels: federal (Bund); state (Bundesländer); and local (Städte). Although 
certain competences are shared by all three levels, certain tasks are of the exclusive 
responsibility of the specific political level. For example, the federal level takes responsibility 
for Foreign Service, while the state takes care of Education (John & Poguntke, 2012: 122). 
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Naturally, the amount of practice of patronage differs among these different levels, as they are 
different in size and function. 
 Although the Personalrat (Staff Council for Civil Servants) is legally involved in 
personnel decisions at both the federal and state level, decisions regarding the appointment of 
positions, especially in the upper hierarchical levels, are customarily a matter of the minister. 
This notion is supported by statistical data, pointing at the minister as the most important 
actor in the appointment process within federal and state ministries (John & Poguntke, 2012: 
130-132). Additionally, John and Poguntke claim these appointments are solely based on 
partisan considerations, loyalty, and trust (2012: 131). This belief is echoed by the 2005 
elections, where the Grand Coalition-parties (i.e. government coalition of CDU, CSU, and 
SPD) agreed on full autonomy in candidate selection for their individual ministerial positions 
(Fleischer, 2010: 357). This full autonomy combined with the partisan considerations 
excludes democratic patronage as a function, as the political appointments are not 
characterized by its function of representing other political parties. Each individual party was 
allowed to appoint their individual candidates, to fulfill the party’s interest. Additionally, the 
characteristics of loyalty and support for “substantive and strategic objectives”, as Fleischer 
(2010: 361) classifies it, point to tactical patronage, as the appointments are used to advance 
specific policy agenda’s.   
 Similar practice of patronage can be found in German non-departmental agencies and 
commissions (NDAC’s) at the federal and state level. These quasi-autonomous non-
governmental agencies and commissions, also known as quango’s, generally deliver public 
services or function as advisors to ministerial departments. As within ministries, party 
political considerations are the main shareholders in the appointments of positions, and are 
strongly influenced by the minister and its staff. John and Poguntke claim that the conditions 
for appointments are generally based on party membership. If there are more positions 
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available, these appointments follow the logic of “proportional representation” (2012: 134-
135). The first observation is clearly party focused, hinting at organizational and/or tactical 
patronage, while the second seemingly functions more as democratic patronage. 
The position of CDU, CSU and SPD is important in the evaluation of functional 
patronage in Germany, as Goetz witnessed a gradual cartellisation in the German system 
(1999: 147), where political parties collectively exploit their dominance, based on the 
common interest in the consolidation of their position of power, resulting in inter-party 
cooperation and a decline of party competition (Katz & Mair, 1995; Detterbeck, 2005: 176). 
The façade of democratic patronage might therefor not necessarily be in order to improve 
diversity, but to expand the party’s influence, indicating organizational patronage. The CDU, 
CSU, and SPD basically agreed to secure each other’s position. 
6.1.2    The Italian Bureaucracy 
Similar to the German system, party patronage is driven by the urge to expand organizational 
control as loyalty and trust are important characteristics in the recruitment process (Di 
Mascio, 2012: 237-240). The appointments of party loyalists to top positions allow party 
governors to control policy design and administrative structures.  
 However, the Italian country-case differs on two important aspects: (1) The 
qualifications of appointees, and (2) the motivation for appointments. First, contrary to 
Germany, data on patronage in the Italian country-case shows the importance of personal 
allegiance over political allegiance. According to John and Poguntke’s data, qualifications of 
appointees in Germany are professionalism (95.1%), closely followed by political allegiance 
(92.7%), while personal allegiance comes in third (73.2%) (2012) (figure 6.1). In Italy, the 
data shows a different picture. Professionalism remains the most important qualification 
(93.3%), but is followed by personal allegiance (84.4%), while political allegiance is of 
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significant less importance (22.2%) (Di Mascio, 2012).  
 
Figure 6.1 | Qualifications of appointees in Germany and Italy (John & Poguntke, 2012; Di Mascio, 2012) 
 
The explanation of this difference can be found in the Italy’s political history. The 
volatility of the Italian party system is the result of the 1992-1994 collapse of the party system 
and additional administrative reforms of the mid 1990s, which radically reshaped the Italian 
political landscape (Hellman, 2009: 314). The big political parties from before lost their 
dominance and the partitocrazia (party system with one or more dominant parties, i.e. 
Germany) from a bygone era (generally branded as the ‘First Republic’; Della Porta, 1997: 
35) was replaced by a heavily fragmented political arena, in where no party receives a clear 
majority and coalition building has become a complex, dreadful process (the ‘Second 
Republic’). The fragmentation and volatility of the Second Republic created a sense of 
pragmatism among political actors, who are willing to shift their loyalty and put ideology 
aside if that suits their best interest. With this lack of loyalty political allegiance has becomes 
subordinate to personal allegiance, and recruitment is no longer a party process, but a matter 
of party individuals. 
95,1% 92,7% 
73,2% 
93,3% 
22,2% 
84,4% 
0,0%
10,0%
20,0%
30,0%
40,0%
50,0%
60,0%
70,0%
80,0%
90,0%
100,0%
Professionalism Political Allegiance Personal Allegiance
Germany Italy
37 
 
 What does this imply for bureaucracy as a prerequisite in the triangular relation to 
patronage and corruption? A LNA shows a significant, rather strong (negative) correlation 
between personal allegiance and corruption (table 6.1). This indicates that whenever personal 
allegiance is considered more important as a qualification for an appointee, the levels of 
corruption (CPI) are likely to be higher. This would apply to the Italian situation and offers an 
explanation for its high levels of corruption compared to Germany, as personal allegiance 
plays second fiddle, behind professionalism rather than political allegiance as is the case in 
Germany.   
 
  Personal Allegiance CPI Score 
Personal Allegiance 
Pearson Correlation 1 -.570 
Sig. (2-tailed)  0.026 
N 15 15 
CPI Score 
Pearson Correlation -.570 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.026  
N 15 15 
Table 6.1 | Correlation between the CPI and personal allegiance 
 
This relation along with the development in the Italian party system is likely to require 
a slight modification of our understanding of organizational patronage, as this is in the Italian 
country-case not a matter of the political party, but from the individual actor. Within the 
Italian system, the politician is relatively stronger than the party in the recruitment process, as 
his personal network is preferred over that of the party. Patronage does not necessarily serve 
the political party, but is likely to be an instrument to the individual political actor, as he relies 
on his personal network. The connection to corruption is more difficult. A seemingly obvious 
assumption such as the decreased significance of social mechanisms and the general strength 
of political parties would imply a correlation between party allegiance and corruption, as the 
latter should decrease when party allegiance would increase. However, empirical testing does 
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not support a certain assumption, as it is rather weak (-0.373) and, above all, not significant 
(table 6.2).   
 
  Political Allegiance CPI Score 
Political Allegiance 
Pearson Correlation 1 -.373 
Sig. (2-tailed)  0.171 
N 15 15 
CPI Score 
Pearson Correlation -.373 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.171  
N 15 15 
Table 6.2 | Correlation between the CPI and political allegiance 
  
Personal allegiance allows political actors to recruit ‘like-minded’ appointees who are 
unlikely to threaten their position. Since its personal interest is the main concern of the 
political actor, it will highly value personal loyalty and trust. In their turn, the recruits are 
likely to copy the elite behavior, as Machiavelli suggested that “what the prince does the 
many will do so – for in their eyes the prince is ever in their view” (Werner, 1983: 149). The 
Italian country-case supports this claim, as corrupt politicians have a “rare capacity for 
networking” (Della Porta, 1997: 36). An additional explanation for the link between personal 
allegiance and corruption will be examined in section 6.4 which will look into organized 
crime and the position of the Mafia in Italian politics in specific. 
6.1.3    Conclusion 
Both the German and Italian country-case has shown similar mechanisms of patronage, as 
organizational and (to a lesser degree) tactical patronage is witnessed. The cartelization in 
Germany creates a sense of ‘democratic patronage’ but disguises organizational and tactical 
purposes via cartellisation. What differentiates both country-cases is the character of 
organizational patronage. The qualification of personal allegiance is of great significance in 
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the Italian country-case, while political allegiance is a more important characteristic in 
Germany. The personal links in the Italian system, as a result of its volatile party system, 
allows politicians to exploit their position and pursue their personal interests, rather than the 
public interest. Both LNA and SNA show a relation between personal allegiance and 
corruption as a prerequisite in the Italian country-case. 
6.2    Patronage and Morality 
The second difference the available data points out a second difference between the German 
and Italian country-case is the system’s. While in Germany the motivation for appointments 
are equally driven by both ‘control’ and ‘reward and control’ (John & Poguntke, 2012), the 
most common motivation is a combination of reward and control, rather than only control (Di 
Mascio, 2012) (figure 6.2). Both datasets point out that appointments used solely as a reward 
are in neither country-case the main motivation. These motivations are related to the norms 
and morale of the system, given the (significant) relation to patronage (i.e. correlation 
coefficient of .516). High levels of patronage are more likely to occur when the reward and 
control function is more important within a given system (table 6.3). Although norms and 
morale are conceptually different, they coincide greatly, as they both are constraints to 
behavior (Bicchieri & Muldoorn, 2011).  
 
  Patronage Reward & Control 
Patronage 
Pearson Correlation 1 .516 
Sig. (2-tailed)  0.049 
N 15 15 
Reward & Control 
Pearson Correlation .516 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.049  
N 15 15 
Table 6.3 | Correlation between patronage and ‘Reward & Control’ as the main motivation for appointments 
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Figure 6.2 | Motivations for patronage in Germany and Italy (John & Poguntke, 2012; Di Mascio, 2012) 
 
The differentiation between Germany and Italy can be derived from the ruling morale 
in both systems. The German bureaucracy has its roots in a Weberian tradition, in which 
professional training, the merit principle, and the career system are the core principles. 
Germany’s totalitarian past has created an increased awareness in German politics and 
legislature, resulting in the revival of late 1700s’ legislation and institutionalization of the 
bureaucracy after World War II. Professional training, “devotion of full work capacity”, and 
party political neutrality are some of the core principles of the German bureaucracy. 
Additionally, the Basic Law encompasses regulations that aim at the promotion of equal 
access to public service employment and endeavors to transcend gender, social and 
geographical backgrounds. Although the public administration is bound by law in all Western 
democracies, these legal characteristics of the German bureaucracy “distinguishes itself by the 
relationship to politics”, contrary to other Western country-cases (Derlien, 2003: 104-107).  
Although the principles of a Weberian bureaucracy seemingly contradict political 
patronage, German political parties clearly have been able to implement its mechanisms 
within the legal limits of the Basic Law. Through ‘reshuffle’ and the establishment of new 
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positions political parties are able to increase their control. Party-members and -loyalists are 
likely candidates to fill these positions, while non-party members and political dissents are 
generally out of consideration (Derlien, 2003: 114). This notion is echoed by the composition 
of party membership, as public sector employees are significantly over-represented among 
party member ranks. While this group makes up 11.6% of the German workforce, they 
accounted for 28% to 42% of party members (‘Biehl, 2006’ in John & Poguntke, 2012: 122). 
Party allegiance is considered an ‘additional criterion’ to professional training in the political 
recruitment process, rather than an ‘exclusive criterion’ (Derlien, 2003: 115). Public 
employees are aware of this, as party membership is generally considered as a boost to career 
prospects (John & Poguntke, 2012: 122)   
 The Italian bureaucratic morale (as well as other Southern European bureaucracies 
such as Spain and Greece) is ruled by the Napoleonic tradition. Rather than professional 
qualification clientelism and the presence of reward are the core principles of the Napoleonic 
tradition (Di Mascio, 2012: 229-230). Evaluation of the Italian civil service shows an 
“ossified” picture, as the highest ranks of the ministries mainly consist of men (95%) over the 
age of 56 (71%) (Cassese, 1999: 59). Additionally, these officials generally hold degrees in 
either law or political science (66%) and are a rather homogenous group. Horizontal mobility 
(i.e. interdepartmental mobility) is rare as vertical mobility (i.e. intra-departmental mobility) 
is the norm within the Italian bureaucracy, which is strongly dependent on age and length of 
service, rather than professionalization and performance. The Italian bureaucracy is an old 
boys’ network; rather conservative with an internal and closed job market, with little 
professional and geographical mobility (Cassese, 1999: 57-59). Attempts of successful reform 
have scarcely been observed. Regulations to promote horizontal mobility and the introduction 
of a merit system all were modified and undermined during the implementation process, 
restraining its efficacy (Cassese, 1997: 60-61).    
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The ruling norms and morale within Germany set the standard in regard to the 
motivational function of patronage. While the German morale is the result of the Weberian 
bureaucracy model, the Italian bureaucracy is rooted in a Napoleonic tradition, in which 
appointments are not only motivated by control, but also as a mean to reward its loyalists. 
Although its relation to patronage (i.e. high levels of ‘reward and control’ as motivation for 
appointments are likely to coincide with high levels of patronage) is empirically supported, 
the data does not show a similar relation to corruption (table 6.4). An LNA shows a moderate, 
negative relation between both concepts, but neither the CPI (correlation coefficient of -
0.461) nor the CC (-0.451) score pass the significance test (< 0.05).   
 
  Reward & Control CC CPI 
Reward & Control 
Pearson Correlation 1 -.451 -.461 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .091 .084 
N 15 15 15 
CC 
Pearson Correlation -.451 1 .981 
Sig. (2-tailed) .091  .000 
N 15 15 15 
CPI 
Pearson Correlation -.461 .981 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .084 .000  
N 15 15 15 
Table 6.4 | Correlation between CC, CPI, and ‘reward and control’ as main motivation of appointments 
 
 
Additional testing does not provide different results (table 6.5). Statistical testing of 
‘control’ as the sole motivation for appointments, and corruption measured in terms of the 
CPI and CC show a not only negligible relations (respectively 0.094 and 0.097) but are above 
all far from significance (respectively 0.739 and 0.739 > 0.05). 
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  CC CPI Control 
CC 
Pearson Correlation 1 .981 .097 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .003 .732 
N 15 15 15 
CPI 
Pearson Correlation .981 1 .094 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  .739 
N 15 15 15 
Control 
Pearson Correlation .097 .094 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .732 .739  
N 15 15 15 
Table 6.5 | Correlation between CC, CPI, and  ‘control’ as main motivation of appointments 
 
Conclusion 
Additional to the differentiation in the qualifications for appointees in Germany and Italy, 
both systems differ in terms of motivation for appointments. Data on the motivations for 
appointments in Germany show a divided picture, as control solely, and reward and control 
are considered the underlying intent of appointments. Data on this matter is equally divided 
(i.e. respectively 47.4% and 50.0%). The Italian country-case shows a different picture, as 
data suggests that the ‘reward and control’ function is considered the general driving force 
behind appointments. These motivations spring from, inter alia, the bureaucratic tradition and 
the morale related to it. While in Germany appointments in the civil sector are regulated 
within its Basic Law, securing representation and the inclusion of e.g. women and minorities, 
Italy’s civil service resembles that of an old boys’ network, with little interdepartmental 
mobility and the overrepresentation of middle aged men.  
 Davidson’s (1992) claim that professionalization (i.e. recruitment on the basis of 
education, competences) decreases the likeliness of corruption is not supported by LNA. The 
initial visual differentiation between the German and Italian country-case in regard to its 
bureaucratic morale in terms of motivations for appointments and a similar differentiation in 
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the levels of corruption is not reflected in the LNA, as it shows no (significant) relation to 
corruption. The initial, anecdotal assumption, based on the German and Italian country-case, 
that the nature of motivation plays a role in regard to the levels of corruption lacks a statistical 
foundation.   
6.3    Patronage and Poverty and Inequality 
The previous sections, outlining the prerequisites of corruption, gave varying but supportive 
results in this empirical pursuit of a better understanding of its relation to patronage. With 
these insights under the belt, this thesis will move on to the analysis of the proximates in the 
upcoming sections. 
 Poverty is one of the few concepts in political science that is as, or perhaps even more 
prevalent than corruption. As with corruption, countless academics and policy makers rack 
their brains on the concept itself, its causes and its consequences. One of the more suitable 
and more accepted indexes to measure poverty is the United Nation’s (UN) (2012) Human 
Development Index (HDI), as it defines poverty in a relative sense, rather than an absolute 
sense. Poverty in an absolute sense does not take cross-country differences into account (e.g. 
costs of goods, services), as it refers to a fixed income threshold for all countries (e.g. 2$ per 
day-mark). However, despite this added nuance, statistical evaluation shows no relation of the 
HDI to patronage, as it does not pass the significance test (0.271 > 0.05) (table 6.6). Contrary 
to patronage, the HDI, in line with expectations, does show a strong (positive) relation to 
corruption (correlation coefficient of 0.692, significance of 0.004), as initially suggested by 
Perry (1999): Country-cases which tend to perform rather well in terms of HDI (i.e. low levels 
of poverty), are likely to score well in terms of the CPI (i.e. low levels of corruption). 
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  HDI CPI CC 
HDI 
Pearson Correlation 1 -.692 -.304 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .004 .271 
N 15 15 15 
CPI 
Pearson Correlation .692 1 -.719 
Sig. (2-tailed) .004  .003 
N 15 15 15 
CC 
Pearson Correlation -.304 -.719 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .271 .003  
N 15 15 15 
Table 6.6 | Correlation between HDI, CPI, and corruption 
 
In the light of Alam’s countervailing action-theory (1995), and Dabla-Norris and 
Wade’s theory (2002) on the allocation of human and financial capital similar results are 
achieved. The Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index (IHDI) takes the critique on 
Alam’s notion into account, by measuring the HDI in relative terms, but adjusts it, as it names 
suggests, to potential inequality within a given country-case. However, despite this added 
nuance, no relation is found between the data of patronage and the IHDI, as it lacks 
significance (0.142 > 0.05) (table 6.7). 
 
  CPI Patronage IHDI 
CPI 
Pearson Correlation 1 -.719 .766 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .003 .001 
N 15 15 15 
Patronage 
Pearson Correlation -.719 1 -.398 
Sig. (2-tailed) .003  .142 
N 15 15 15 
IHDI 
Pearson Correlation .766 -.398 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .001 .142  
N 15 15 15 
Table 6.7 | Correlation between IHDI, CPI, and corruption 
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Conclusion 
Despite is reciprocal relation to corruption, a potential relation between poverty and patronage 
is not supported by empirical evidence. Similar results are achieved in regard to inequality 
and patronage. Neither the HDI, nor the inequality adjusting IHDI passes significance in 
connection to the available data on patronage. Within the European context of this thesis, both 
concepts are isolated according to the statistical analysis. However, in regard to this context, 
generalizations on this matter should be treated with caution. The country-cases in this thesis’ 
selection are ranked ‘very high’ or ‘high’ (i.e. Bulgaria) (United Nations, 2013) and the 
differentiation between the scores in the HDI and IHDI are rather small. Poverty and 
inequality are of less relevance to the included country-cases. Conversely, a more diverse case 
selection is not in the interest of this thesis, as it is solely interested in the German and Italian 
country-case.  
6.4    Patronage and Organized Crime  
Like corruption and to a lesser extent patronage, organized crime is a difficult phenomenon to 
measure, partly to its illicit and secretive character. Data is often lacking and its conceptual 
complexity (e.g. different levels of analysis, diverse units of analysis) causing academic 
quarrel over an agreed-upon and established definition (Vitorrio & Damani, 2011: 136). 
Ironically, the European Union launched a project to measure organized crime before its 
member states agreed on a definition (Von Lampe, 2004: 86-87). Additionally to its secretive 
character, estimates of the value of black markets are complicated due to the overlap of 
money earned in illicit activities of organized crime (e.g. corruption, money laundering) and 
its increasingly transnational character in today’s day and age of globalization. The cross 
border-ability of organized crime was once emphasized by the Bavarian prosecution cases 
against Italian Mafia syndicates in Germany (Havocscope, 2013).  
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 Despite the discord, Black et al. conceptualizes organized crime as ‘a function of the 
market for illicit goods and services’ (‘2001’ in Von Lampe, 2004: 94-95). When these are 
investigated the revenues of organized crime are considerable, as they account for billions and 
make up a significant share of the GDP of states throughout the world. In states as Bulgaria, 
Italy and Spain revenues of organized crime are up to 5-8% of the national GDP, while 
percentages in Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway are much more modest (> 0.01%) 
(Havocscope, 2013; World Bank, 2013).   
Nevertheless, preliminary statistical testing of the data shows no relation of organized 
crime to patronage, as it is far from significance (table 6.8). Based on this outcome, no 
generalizations can be made about the scale of organized crime and patronage in the European 
context. According to the LNA, Italy’s levels of patronage are not related to its struggle with 
mafia syndicates as the Camorra or ‘Ndrangheta.   
 
  Patronage Organized Crime 
Patronage 
Pearson Correlation 1 .156 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .595 
N 15 14 
Organized Crime 
Pearson Correlation .156 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .595  
N 14 14 
Table 6.8 | Correlation between organized crime and patronage 
 
 However, SNA and in-depth investigation of the Italian country-case puts this claim in 
question. Although organized crime is a cause of concern for all included country-cases, the 
Italian Mafia is a peculiarity. The special position of the Mafia is illustrated by, for example, 
its collaboration with Italian politicians and the CIA, Gladio, which aimed at the ousting of 
communism after post-war Italy (Cayli, 2010: 400). The mafia is deeply rooted in different 
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regions across southern Italy (e.g. Cosa Nostra in Sicily, ‘Ndrangheta in Calabria; Camorra 
in Campania) (Vannucci, 1997: 50) and occasionally ties between these syndicates and 
politicians hit the daylight in the media (e.g. former prime minister Andreotti who was 
accused by Palermo judges of contributing and safeguarding the interests of the Cosa Nostra) 
(Palermo Public Prosecutor’s Office, 1993 in Vannucci, 1997: 51). Although academics and 
policymakers initially regarded the Mafia (as well as corruption) as a ‘southern’ phenomenon, 
its power reaches well into the northern region, and is a national problem, rather than a 
regional problem, affecting multiple higher units within the Italian state (Parliamentary Anti-
Maffia Commission, 1993, in Della Porta, 1997: 42).  
 Before the Italian country-case can be analyzed, it is of the essence to understand how 
the Mafia operates and how it is linked with corruption. Contrary to the organized crime in 
other states, the Mafia is an entrepreneur in the business of ‘protection’ (Vannucci, 1997: 51). 
It slightly reminds of a Rousseauan interpretation of state, in where the Mafia functions as an 
institution that ensures that the game is played by the rules. However, this game is 
characterized by illicit practices. The Commissione Parlamentare Antimafia (Parliamentary 
Anti-Mafia Commission) suggested that weak elements within the public administration are 
taken care of by the Mafia (‘1993’, in Vannucci, 1997: 54). In extreme, as illustrated by 
Catania in the 1990s, a Mafia syndicate can be better (i.e. both cheaper and more efficient) in 
providing, for example, protection than the local police (Vannucci, 1997: 55).  
 When Mafia activity is narrowed down to politicians, it often concerns political 
protection (e.g. protection in corrupt transactions, consolidation of illegal agreements, frighten 
potential whistle blowers into silence), but also the supply crucial votes during elections (i.e. 
clientelism), through intimidation and ‘advise’, to increase the chances of electoral success, 
especially in Mafia-afflicted districts in southern Italy (e.g. Campania, Calabria, Sicily) 
(‘Parliamentary Anti-Mafia Commission, 1993’ in Della Porta, 1997, 42-43). The make-or-
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break capability of Mafia syndicates is illustrated by the case of former Palermo mayor 
Insalaco, whose political fate was in hands of the Ciancimino, as he was ousted due to his 
opposite stance on the distribution of public contracts. Intimidation forced him out of office, 
before he eventually was liquidated (Vannucci, 1997).  
 In exchange for its political protection and vote-packages, the Parliamentary Anti-
Mafia Commission concluded that the Mafia receives, inter alia, judicial impunity and control 
of territory (‘1993’ in Della Porta, 1997: 43-45). Additionally, two specific resources point in 
the direction of patronage, as the Mafia is formally allowed in the drivers’ seat. First, the 
report of the Parliamentary Anti-Mafia Commission points out the connection between 
Camorra-clans and politicians. In exchange for the aforesaid resources supplied by the Mafia, 
they receive a say in the selection of candidates for elections and the distribution of contracts 
(‘1993’ in Vannucci, 1997: 58). Patronage has become a resource to the politician and an 
organizational resource to the Mafia as it allows them to expand their influence. Additionally, 
the Mafia strengthens the corrupted politician, creating a downward spiral, where both actors 
receive mutual benefits. Second, the Mafia is included through the delegation of mediatory 
tasks by regional councilors in the allocation of public resources. According to the report, 
they function as an agent between politicians and entrepreneurs, in return for a share in the 
form of a bribe, sometimes up to 25% (‘Palermo Law Courts, 1992’ in Vannucci, 1997: 59-
60). By its ability to influence these decisions and favor its clients, Mafia syndicates are able 
to strengthen their territorial position. 
Conclusion 
Although LNA did not provide a significant relation of organized crime to patronage, SNA of 
the Italian country-case showed a different image. Organized crime in Italy is a peculiarity as 
it comes in a different shape and function than in other country-cases. The Parliamentary 
Anti-Mafia Commission has documented the mechanisms how the Mafia (successfully) 
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attempts to connect to political actors and interferes within the political system up to the 
highest political echelons. Their ability to protect and distribute votes to politicians, grants 
them access to the political process. The report of the Parliamentary Anti-Mafia Commission 
concluded that in certain cases the Mafia controls the selection of candidates and functions as 
a broker in the distribution of public contracts. By entering the political structure of Italy, the 
Mafia is able to expand their influence and further increase corrupt activity.   
 The unique position of the Mafia in Italian politics also sheds a different light on how 
personal allegiance as an important motivation for corruption leads to corruption. By 
engaging in patronage it can put its favored candidates in a position to increase their position 
of power and expand their scope of control. The initial politician essentially becomes an 
instrument to the Mafia. Although this increases the understanding on the earlier variable, the 
Mafia offers only a partial explanation to the relation of personal allegiance to corruption. 
Without data on its exact influence it is difficult to determine to what extent they are involved 
in this connection and how strong this relation is. 
 
7    Conclusion 
The conceptual complexity of corruption and interconnectedness of the different variables 
relating to patronage and corruption prohibits finding a ‘smoking gun’. Rarely is corruption, 
or any phenomenon in social sciences for that matter, the consequences of one single 
proximate. Rather a combination of qualifications of appointees, the bureaucracy’s morale in 
terms of tradition and the interference of organized crime in Italy all contribute   
With the initial relationship between patronage and corruption statistically proven, the 
analysis of the German and Italian bureaucracy exposed a differentiation between both 
systems. Although examination showed both bureaucracies relied to certain extents on 
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organizational and tactical patronage, the key difference was the qualification of appointees in 
each system. While professionalism and political allegiance are the key qualifications in 
Germany, the Italian recruitment process relies more on professional and personal, rather than 
political allegiance. This Italian trend can be explained by the political changes in Italy in the 
early 1990s, reshaping its political landscape. Ideology and party loyalty made place for 
pragmatism and opportunism. Italian patronage is predominantly out of self-interest, while the 
same phenomenon in Germany generally serves the political party. The step from personal 
allegiance to corruption is not a clear one and is also part of the bureaucracy’s general morale 
and the interference of organized crime in Italy. The propriety of this assumption is supported 
by LNA, as a similar relation can be found when this analysis is taken to the systemic level.  
 In extension of Italy’s difference in required qualifications, its bureaucracy is also 
fundamentally different. Germany’s bureaucracy is characterized by a Weberian tradition, in 
which professionalization and merit are at the heart. Its totalitarian past created a sense of 
urgency, as this tradition is translated into laws and regulation, making sure the bureaucracy is 
a solid representation of society, representing women, minorities and geographical areas. 
Italy’s bureaucracy shows a different picture. Its Napoleonic tradition created an ossified old 
boys’ network, which lacks active horizontal mobility. The old boys’ network is also reflected 
in terms of the motivations for appointments, as these also function as a reward along with the 
need of control of political parties. Although patronage in country-cases such as Greece and 
Spain follow the same mechanisms of reward and control as motivation, share characteristics 
of Italy’s Napoleonic bureaucratic tradition, and perform equally poor in terms of levels of 
corruption (i.e. high levels of corruption) LNA does not provide a significant relation between 
‘reward & control’ as main motivation for appointments and corruption. 
 Third, although initial LNA showed no significant relation between organized crime 
and patronage, the Italian country-case is unique and unlike the others of the case selection. 
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The Mafia is deeply rooted in Italian society and is not limited to the south, as the 
Parliamentary Anti-Mafia Commission concluded, but reaches well into the higher echelons 
of national Italian politics. In return for its service, politicians allow Mafia clans into the 
political process, putting them in the driver’s seat when it comes to the selection of candidates 
in elections and function as a broker in the appointment of public contracts. Naturally, the 
Mafia is little concerned with the public interest as their political interference is 
predominantly in their personal interest, aiming at the expansion of their influence and 
improving their financial liquidity. 
 The presence of the Mafia also shines a different light at Italy’s bureaucracy. Its 
malicious intent raises questions in regard to personal allegiance as important qualification for 
appointments. As showed, this is the result of Italian political reshuffle of the 1990s, but the 
independence of politicians can be questioned in light of the occasional dominance of the 
Mafia. The Mafia as variable helps to explain the step from personal allegiance to corruption. 
Although the Parliamentary Anti-Mafia Commission recognized the Mafia’s considerate 
influence on Italian politics, its actual influence is an interesting starting point for additional 
analysis worth of exploration. 
 Fourth, although poverty is one of the most common explanations for corruption, 
neither LNA nor SNA showed any insights on the initial German-Italian differentiation. 
Statistical analysis did not show a relation to patronage as poverty seemed an unfit variable in 
regard to the composition of this thesis’ case-selection. Although Italy, and the south of 
Europe, is generally considered to be the ‘poor’ region within Europe, this notion is rather 
relative, as it scores high in terms of the HDI. Although there can be no generalizations made 
on the relation between patronage and corruption on a global scale, poverty is irrelevant 
within this thesis’ German-Italian framework, or even the European framework.      
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 Clearly, all these variables, both prerequisites and proximate, are part of the bigger 
picture, as they all interact with each other. The Mafia interference in the bureaucracy is a 
clear example of this. Due to this interconnectedness it is difficult how these variables are 
shaped in the absence of another. However, as the German and Italian country-case has 
shown, the right mix of prerequisites and proximates easily allows patronage to spin out of 
control, right into corruption.  
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